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NOTES
Compulsory Sterilization of the Mentally III and Retarded:
In re Sterilization of Moore
The director of the Forsyth County Department of Social Services, pursuant to the North Carolina compulsory sterilization statute,' filed a petition
with the county district court seeking a court order for sterilization of Joseph

Lee Moore. The director alleged that unless sterilized Moore would likely
procreate children afflicted with serious physical, mental, or nervous diseases or deficiencies. 2 In a motion to dismiss the petition respondent alleged
that the North Carolina statute violated his right to procedural and substantive due process, denied him equal protection of the law, and was unconstitutionally vague. 3 Both the district court and the superior court which heard the

matter de novo upheld respondent's challenge. On petitioner's appeal the
case came before the North Carolina Supreme Court. Held, reversed: In light
of the extensive procedural protections accorded the subject of a steriliza-

tion, the North Carolina compulsory sterilization statute for mentally ill and
retarded persons represents a reasonable and valid exercise of the police
power which violates neither the right to substantive due process nor equal

protection, and is not unconstitutionally vague. In re Sterilization of Moore,
289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
I.

COMPULSORY STERILIZATION OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED:
STATUTES, SCIENCE, AND THE COURTS

At the close of the nineteenth century four scientific developments composed the theoretical basis for compulsory sterilization of the mentally hand1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to -50 (Supp. 1975). Section 35-39 provides:
The county director of social services. . . is hereby authorized to petition the
district court of his county for the sterilization operation of any mentally ill or
mentally retarded resident of the county ....
(3) When in his opinion such . . . non-institutionalized individual would be
likely, unless sterilized, to procreate a child or children who would have a
tendency to serious physical, mental, or nervous disease or deficiency; or,
because of a physical, mental, or nervous disease or deficiency which is not
likely to materially improve, the person would be unable to care for a child
or children.
The present statute represents a portion of the major revision of North Carolina statutes dealing
with the mentally incompetent by which the 1973 legislature sought to incorporate more extensive
due process safeguards. See generally Comment, North Carolina's New Mental Health Laws:
More Due Proces, 52 N.C.L. REV. 589 (1974).
2. Included in the petition were the results'of psychological tests indicating that the 16-year
old Moore had a full scale I.Q. of under 40 (compared with the general population mean of 100)
and a test age of 8. Report of Psychological Evaluation Done at Child Guidance Clinic, July 28,
1975. Of the sterilizations performed under an earlier North Carolina statute between 1962 and
1964, 30% were performed on children between the ages of l0 and 19. Ferster, Eliminating the
Unfit-Is Sterilization the Answer?, 27 OHIO ST. L.J. 591, 621 (1966).
3. A fifth challenge, that the statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment, was summarily rejected by the court since the procedure in question was not imposed as punishment for a
crime nor applied to those convicted of a crime.
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icapped: 4 Sir Francis Galton's theories of eugenics, 5 popular notions of Darwinism, the rediscovery of Mendel's work on inheritance, and the development of relatively safe and effective surgical techniques for the sterilization
of men and women. Attempts were immediately made to translate this untried
theory into law. By 1907 Indiana had enacted the first law providing for
compulsory sterilization of mental defectives. 6 Judicial approval was slower
in coming. 7 Not until 1925 did a state supreme court uphold such a statute.'
In 1927 the United States Supreme Court addressed the question in Buck v.
Bell,9 upholding a Virginia statute against an attack alleging that involuntary
sterilization of the mentally retarded denied equal protection of the law and
violated due process. Justice Holmes employed the reasonable relationship
test I0 in summarily dismissing the allegation that involuntary sterilization of
institutionalized mental defectives denied equal protection. The principal
issue was whether the statute comported with substantive due process. Justice Holmes first emphasized the scrupulous procedural protections accorded
those subject to the law. These protections included notice, the opportunity
to appear at the agency hearing, and the right to a trial de novo in the circuit

court. IIIn light of these protections and the relationship between the end to be
of the Court
achieved and the means provided by the statute, the judgment
2
was not to be substituted for that of the legislature.
Justice Holmes, analogizing the position of mental defectives under the
Virginia statute to that of citizens who were required to sacrifice their lives in
war or to submit to compulsory vaccination for the public welfare, 3 found
that the state could legitimately "prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind."'

4

The assumptions underlying the decision were clear:

4. Ferster, supra note 2, at 591-92.
5. The eugenics theory asserted that man could improve the quality of the species by
promoting the procreation of the best men or preventing the procreation of the defective.
Biological eugenics was based on the concept that those who are defective transmit this deficiency through genetic channels. Environmental eugenics was based on the premise that those
who are defective provide an inadequate nurturing environment which in turn produces deficient
offspring. For a complete discussion of the theory see N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT
298 (1971).
6. Ind. Acts of 1907, ch. 215, cited in O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Sterilization, 45 GEO. L.J.
20, 22 (1956).
7. For early decisions holding state compulsory sterilization laws unconstitutional see
Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2 (1921); Smith v. Board of Examiners of Feebleminded, 85 N.J.L. 46, 88 A. 963 (Sup. Ct. 1913); In re Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N.Y.S. 638
(Sup. Ct.), aff'dmem, sub nun. Osborn v. Thomson, 185 App. Div. 902,171 N.Y.S. 1094(1918).
8. Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925); Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130
S.E. 516 (1925), aff'd, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). The Michigan statute authorized sterilization of
mental defectives but not the insane. The Virginia statute, however, authorized sterilization of
the insane, the feebleminded, and epileptics.
9. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
10. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61(1911). For an excellent discussion of equal protection analysis see
Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I (1972).
II. 274 U.S. at 206-07.
12. Id.
13. Both analogies have been sharply criticized by the commentators. When citizens are
compelled to give their lives in war, there is "a necessity and an urgency that causes us to
sacrifice men in self-defense which is wholly lacking in the case of eugenic sterilization." O'Hara
& Sanks, supra note 6, at 29-30. When citizens require immunization against smallpox, the
etiology of the disease is well established and the bodily invasion is minimal. See AMERICAN BAR
FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 213 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971).

14.

274 U.S. at 207.
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(I) the mechanisms of heredity in mental deficiency are clearly established
and provable; (2) society is threatened with the imminent prospect of being
"swamped with incompetence"; and (3) as opposed to the sacrifices of the
"best citizens," the loss of the procreative right is a "lesser sacrifice" to the
mentally deficient. 5
Buck did not quell the controversy surrounding compulsory sterilization.

Within ten years of the decision serious doubts concerning the scientific16
validity of the eugenics theory were raised in the medical community.
Research demonstrated the extreme complexity and uncertainty involved in
the inheritance of mental illness and retardation. 17 Moreover, inquiry into the
nature of mental disorders revealed a broad spectrum of ability, proclivity,
and comprehension among those grouped as mental defectives. 8 Finally,
evolution of constitutional theory and analysis has established a new
framework within which the compulsory sterilization laws must be
considered.
This approach was exemplified in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 9 the only other
Supreme Court decision dealing directly with the constitutionality of an
involuntary sterilization law. In that case the Court sustained an equal protec-

tion challenge to a state statute permitting sterilization of habitual criminals
for eugenic reasons. Although explicitly reserving judgment on the issue of
substantive due process, the Court held that procreation represents a basic
liberty and that any attempt by the state to interfere with that liberty would be
subject to strict scrutiny.20 Since Skinner the Court has firmly established
15. Id. In the decade following Buck twenty states enacted eugenics sterilization laws. Note,
Human Sterilization, 35 IOWA L. REV. 251, 253 n.12 (1950). In almost all of the relatively few
cases reaching appellate courts the Buck decision has been relied upon to uphold such laws. A
complete collection of such cases may be found in Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 960 (1973).
16. See COMMITrEE FOR INVESTIGATION OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION, AMERICAN
NEUROLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT 178-83 (1936). The committee concluded that in view of the
lack of scientific knowledge about heredity any sterilization law should be purely voluntary.
17. For a discussion of the complex scientific data in the area see Note, Eugenic
Sterilization-A Scientific Analysis, 46 DENVER L.J. 631 (1969). See alsoMENTAL RETARDATION:
A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRIMARY PHYSICIAN, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
CONFERENCE ON MENTAL RETARDATION

(1969). Basically the studies indicate:

(1) Although over 200 causes of mental retardation are known (including biological,
psychological, and socio-cultural factors), aside from a very few rare and specific disorders, the
role of heredity in mental deficiency is not clear. Hereditary causation in mental illness is even
more uncertain.
(2) While mentally retarded parents tend to have a higher incidence of mentally retarded
children, up to 89% of their children are not retarded.
(3) Conversely, 80-90% of mentally defective children are born to normal parents who,
although they cannot be identified, presumably carry recessive genes for mental retardation.
Thus, assuming mental retardation is hereditary, it has been estimated that even if all the mentally
retarded were sterilized, the number of mentally retarded in the next generation would fall by
only 11%.
(4) In view of mutagens in the environment complete elimination of mental retardation may
be impossible.
18. See COMMITTEE FOR INVESTIGATION OF EUGENICAL STERILIZATION, supra note 16, as
reported in Ferster, supra note 2: "There is nothing to indicate that mental disease andmental
defect are increasing, and from this standpoint, there is no evidence of a biological deterioration
of the race." Id. at 602. Among the profoundly and severely retarded, who are often sterilized
and must be institutionalized in any case, the sexual drive is usually quite limited. MENTAL
RETARDATION:

A

HANDBOOK FOR THE PRIMARY PHYSICIAN,

supra note 17, at 50. Sexually

inappropriate behavior of the mildly retarded, who constitute 90% of the retarded, is attributable
in part to a lack of sexual education. Roos, PsychologicalImpact of Sterilization on the Individual, 1975 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 45, 48.
19. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
20. Id. at 541. Procreation was held to be fundamental to the existence and survival of man.
Thus, the subject of a sterilization procedure is deprived forever of a basic liberty.
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procreation as a fundamental right. 2 Further, the Court's 1973 decision in
Roe v. Wade,22 while focusing primarily on a woman's right to undergo an
abortion voluntarily, incorporated
the procreative right into the constitution23
privacy.
of
right
protected
ally

II.

IN RE STERILIZATION OF MOORE

Respondent first challenged the involuntary sterilization statute on the
grounds that the statute's failure to provide funds for obtaining medical
experts on behalf of the sterilization subject and to require cross-examination
in the hearing procedure violated procedural due process. In response to
these arguments the North Carolina Supreme Court first stressed the extensive procedural protections afforded respondent, which include notice, right
to counsel at all stages, right to a hearing de novo in the superior court, and a
further right of appeal to the higher courts.2 4 The court then pointed out that
while the sterilization statute does not on its face provide funds for the
services of expert witnesses on behalf of indigents, other provisions of the
North Carolina General Statutes allow the court discretion to approve payment of state funds for such services.25 Further, while the right of crossexamination is not mandated in every sterilization hearing, the respondent or
his court-appointed counsel has only to object in writing to the petition in
order to be fully afforded that right. 26 Measured against the yardstick of due
process laid out in Buck,27 the provisions of the North Carolina statute were
held to exceed the minimum requirements of procedural due process.
The court's analysis of respondent's substantive due process challenge is
confusing. The court identified the compelling state interests 28 underlying the
North Carolina sterilization statute as the potential life of the child and the
health of the parent, 29 precisely those interests found in Roe to outweigh the
individual's right to privacy.30 Although the exact nature of the state's interest
in the potential life of the child is never clearly defined, the court's citation to
Cook v. State3' suggests that the state's interest lies in part in ensuring fit
21. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485 (1965).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. Id. at 152. In the face of these developments only 19 of the original 32 states passing
compulsory sterilization statutes have maintained them. C. LEVY, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE

LAW 32, 78 (1975). Although an estimated 70,000 persons have been sterilized under such laws,
the numbers have dropped steadily in the last 30 years. However, in 1963 North Carolina alone
accounted for over half the sterilizations performed in the United States under such a law.
HUMAN BETTERMENT ASSOCIATION, 35TH ANNUAL COMPILATION (1963).
24.
25.
26.

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-36 to -50 (Supp. 1975).
Id. § 7A-454 (1969).
Id. § 35-43 (Supp. 1975).

27.
28.

274 U.S. at 206-07.
What precisely constitutes a compelling state interest has never been fully defined by the

United States Supreme Court. It has been suggested that it must be based on a threat of immediate

and significant harm to a vital state interest. See Comment, Sterilization of Mental Defectives:
Compulsion and Consent, 27, BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 179 (1975).
29.

289 N.C. at 101, 104, 221 S.E.2d at 311, 313.

30. 410 U.S. at 162. The identification of interests which the court seeks to establish is
dubious. In Roe the majority held that the state's interest in the potential life of the child did not
reach the compelling point until the fetus became viable in the last trimester of pregnancy. Id. at
163. Moreover, that interest was in preserving rather than preventing prenatal life. Id. at 150.
31. 9 Ore. App. 224, 495 P.2d 768 (1972). The court in that case held that the state's concern
for the general welfare extended to future generations and could support sterilization of a

mentally ill or retarded person unable to provide a proper environment for a child.
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32
parents for future generations. While this interest is undoubtedly legitimate,
denying life to future generations in order to protect them from unfit parents
33
seems anomalous.
The court identified another aspect of this interest by asserting that the
state has a right to prevent the procreation of children who will become a
burden upon the state. 34 In fact, this interest, as the court's citations to In re
Cavitt35 and Buck demonstrate, is actually a resurrection in another guise of
the scientifically dubious biological eugenics justification. Although respondent's amicus curiae had made a frontal assault upon the scientific validity of
the eugenics justification, 36 the court ignored this line of argument and instead
relied heavily on the Buck decision. The result is the substitution of precedent
for a consideration of the evidence.
The second compelling interest identified by the court is the state's interest
in protecting the health of the mentally ill or retarded person who may be able
to function marginally outside an institution only if he is not burdened by the
responsibility of children. 37 Noting that such an individual may be incapable
of determining his inability to assume such a burden, the court emphasized
that the sterilization procedure does38not harm the individual's sexual function, but only prevents procreation.
Having thus determined the state's interests to be compelling, the court
omitted full consideration of less restrictive alternatives. 39 The court did
suggest that when an individual is unable to practice other forms of birth
control, sterilization becomes the only available remedy. Nevertheless, the
court by no means required such a finding in a hearing on the sterilization
petition.'
The treatment of the equal protection challenge 4' is even more curious. The
court clearly confined review to the "old" equal protection model of reasonable relationship between means and ends. 42 Nowhere did the court advert to

32. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
33. See note 39 infra and accompanying text. Data cited in Murdock, Sterilization of the
Retarded: A Problem or a Solution?, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 930 (1974), indicates that early
intervention through social programs which displace the adverse environmental factors of
children with low I.Q. mothers appears successful in preventing retardation due to environmental
deprivation.
34. 289 N.C. at 103, 221 S.E.2d at 312.
35. 182 Neb. 712, 157 N.W.2d 171 (1968). The court held that to preserve the race the
legislature could limit procreation of those whose "socially injurious tendencies" were
hereditary.
36. Brief for North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Foundation, Inc., as Amicus Curiae
at 6, In re Sterilization of Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976).
37. 289 N.C. at 104, 221 S.E.2d at 313.
38. Id.
39. Brief, supra note 36, at 9. Among the alternatives advanced by respondent were expansion and improvement of traditional psychiatric treatment, medical treatment and prevention of
mental retardation, therapeutic abortions, genetic counselling, the use of IUDs, and birth control
pills.
40. The terms of the statute seem to indicate that some consideration of less restrictive
alternatives is called for: "If the judge of the district court shall find from the evidence that...
the person would be likely, unless sterilized, to procreate . . . he shall enter an order . . .
authorizing the physician. . . to perform the operation." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 (Supp. 1975)
(emphasis added).
41. Respondent had argued that the statute denied equal protection because it was in fact
applied only to indigents, and was underinclusive because it did not apply to pheno-typically
normal persons who might produce mentally ill or retarded children. The court did not deal
specifically with these contentions.
42. 289 N.C. at 104, 221 S.E.2d at 313; see note 10 supra.

SOUTHWESTERN LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 30

the strict scrutiny review which the Supreme Court explicitly mandated in
Skinner.4 3 Defining the object of the statute in question to be the prevention of
procreation by those mentally handicapped persons who would be unable to
care for a child or who would bear children who would also be mentally
handicapped, the court simply held that the classification employed was
reasonable." Noting that the North Carolina statute does not differentiate
between classes of mentally ill or retarded persons, the court asserted that,
while no cases hold sterilization of all mentally handicapped persons to deny
equal protection, many cases hold otherwise."

The principal citation in

support of this finding is, predictably, Buck v. Bell. Yet Buckestablished only
that a statute authorizing sterilization of mental defectives within institutions,
not those outside institutions, did not deny equal protection of the law.
In response to respondent's contention that the statute provides an inadequate standard for the court to determine when sterilization is required,' the
court cited Parkerv. Levy 47 and Arnett v. Kennedy' to support the proposition
that some degree of uncertainty is permissible so long as the terms of the
statute can be complied with sufficiently.4 9 Although admitting that the statute contains "germs of uncertainty," the court concluded that the triers of
fact could comply with its terms when aided by experts in the field.50 The
court further construed the statute so as to require the petitioner in a sterilization proceeding to prove by clear, strong, and convincing evidence that a
1
sterilization order is proper. 5
III.

CONCLUSION

Although compulsory sterilization of the mentally ill and mentally retarded
has continued to decline,52 the decision of In re Sterilizationof Moore demonstrates that the concept of involuntary sterilization for eugenic purposes still
has legal vitality. However, the North Carolina Supreme Court's failure to
deal with the difficult scientific and legal problems presented by compulsory
sterilization of the mentally handicapped reveals that the decision is based on
precedent rather than careful legal reasoning. Ultimately, that precedent is
43.

316 U.S. at 541.

44. 289 N.C. at 104, 221 S.E.2d at 313.

45. Id. In fact, the court cited only two such cases: Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200(1927); Smith
v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925).
46. Specifically, respondent objected to the wording of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-43 (Supp.
1975): "If the judge. . . shall find. . . that the person. . . would probably be unable to care for
a child . . . or because the person would be likely, unless sterilized, to procreate a child ...
which probably would have serious physical, mental, or nervous diseases. . . he shall enter an
order . . . authorizing the physician . . . to perform the operation." (Emphasis added.)
47. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). The Court in that case sustained a statute authorizing the courtmartial of an officer "for conduct unbecoming a gentleman" because the words had a 200-year
history of interpretation in a military context.
48. 416 U.S.134 (1974). In that case, which did not involve a fundamental right, the Court
upheld a statute allowing the removal of fed.eral employees "for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service."
49. See Ferster, supra note 2, at 614 for a discussion of the degree to which enforcement of
state sterilization statutes has been dependent upon the attitudes of officials toward eugenic
sterilization. "Georgia's annual sterilization rate dropped from 112 in 1959 to an all time low of
seven operations in 1963. There were no changes in the sterilization law during that period. 'The
changes have been in the philosophy of the superintendent.... .. Id.
50. 289 N.C. at 108, 221 S.E.2d at 315.
51. Id.
52. See note 23 supra.

